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The Role of Self-Schema in the Foot-in-the-door Technique
The effect that schematicity for helpfulness or 
unhelpfulness might produce on the Foot-in-the-Door 
phenomenon is examined in this investigation. The commonly 
accepted self-perception theory explanation suggests that 
this phenomenon is mediated by a cognitive change that 
occurs as a result of o n e ’s self-perception related to 
o n e ’s compliance with an initial small request. It was 
hypothesized that only individuals who are aschematic with 
respect to the domain of helpfulness or unhelpfulness would 
be affected by a Foot-in-the-Door manipulation.
To test this hypothesis, a screening questionnaire was 
administered to 623 introductory psychology students. Based 
on self-reported helpfulness characteristics, individuals 
were selected for two schematic and two aschematic 
experimental groups and their respective one-contact control 
groups. Experimental subjects were telephoned and asked to 
perform a small initial request. Between two and four days 
later, both experimental subjects and one-contact control 
group members were telephoned and asked to perform a larger 
request. Results showed that a significant reversal of the 
phenomenon occurred and that this trend was present in all 
four conditions. As a consequence, no conclusions could 
be drawn with respect to the hypotheses being tested. 
Possible reasons for. the reversal were discussed.
Director: Frances A. Hill
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CHAPTER 1
Introduct ion
In our society we are continually besieged by efforts 
of others which are intended to alter our attitudes, feelings 
and behavior, and to gain our compliance with their requests. 
Not only do others attempt to influence us, but similarly, 
we strive to influence others with our own appeals. While 
various approaches can be employed to influence another 
effectively, Baron and Byrne (1987) state that "attempts to 
gain compliance through direct requests are one of the most 
common, if not the most common form of social influence"
(p. 240).
An effective method of direct appeal called a multiple 
request procedure involves the use of two requests; the 
second request being that to which compliance is actually 
desired. Multiple request procedures have been demonstrated 
to increase compliance significantly beyond that which occurs 
when only the target request is presented. One multiple 
request technique, commonly known as the foot-in-the-door 
phenomenon (Freedman & Fraser, 1966), has received much 
research attention, not only in psychology, but also in the 
field of marketing.
In 1966, Freedman and Fraser empirically demonstrated 
that agreeing to a small initial request increased the
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probability that one would comply with an ensuing larger 
request, often referred to as the target request. Since 
that time, many studies have focused on what Freedman and 
Fraser named the foot-in-the-door (FITD) phenomenon. Bern’s 
(1972) self-perception theory, which is described in the 
next section, has become commonly accepted (Beaman, Cole, 
Preston, Klentz, & Steblay, 1983; DeJong, 1979; Dillard,
Hunter, & Burgoon, 1984) as the explanation for the effect.
Yet, literature reviews by Beaman et a l . (1983) and DeJong
(1979) suggested that self-perception theory did not completely 
explain the underlying mechanism of the effect and urged 
that more research and theorizing be done.
The Foot-in-the Door Phenomenon
The FITD phenomenon is a compliance enhancing technique 
in which, under conditions of no apparent external pressure 
(DeJong & Musilli, 1982) and minimal external justification 
(Uranowitz, 1975; Zuckerman, Lazzaro, & Waldgeir, 1979), gaining 
assent from another to a small initial request increases the 
probability that the person will comply with a subsequent 
larger request. The effect was initially demonstrated to be 
robust even when the two appeals were separated by a two week 
time delay, involved dissimilar issues, required different 
actions, and were made by different people (Freedman & Fraser, 
1966). However, a comprehensive meta-analysis conducted on 
FITD research by Beaman et a l . (1983) reported that while
"the foot-in-the-door effect does seem to influence subsequent
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compliance, and it is a replicable phenomenon. this
phenomenon is weak and not nearly as robust as has been 
assumed" {p. 191-192).
As noted, self-perception theory has been commonly
accepted (Beaman et a l ., 1983; Dillard et a l ., 1984; DeJong,
1979) as the explanation for the FITD effect. This theory
is based on the two propositions that follow:
Individuals come to "know" their own attitudes, 
emotions, and other internal states partially by 
inferring them from observations of their own overt 
behavior and/or the circumstances in which this 
behavior occurs. Thus, to the extent that internal 
cues are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, the 
individual is functionally in the same position as 
an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily 
rely upon those same external cues to infer the 
individual’s inner states (Bern, 1972, p. 2).
The FITD effect has been thought (Beaman et a l ., 1983; 
DeJong, 1979) to be mediated by a cognitive change which 
occurs as a consequence of o n e ’s self-perception of his or her 
compliance with the initial small request. An individual, 
after observing his or her own behavior and the situational 
context in which it occurs, makes an inference about personal 
feelings, attitudes, and beliefs which produces a change in 
o n e ’s self-image that is consistent with the behavior.
Although Bern’s early self-perception articles (1967,
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1970) were not published until after 1966, Freedman and Fraser 
(1966) seemed to anticipate such an explanation when they 
interpreted the results they had obtained. One can see 
similarities between the self-perception explanation and 
Freedman and Fraser’s earlier interpretations which stated 
that an individual upon seeing him/herself help with a good 
cause without external pressure or justification, comes to 
view him/herself as "the kind of person who does this sort 
of thing, who agrees to requests made by strangers, who takes 
action on things he/she believes in, who cooperates with good 
causes" (1966, p. 231). This alteration in o n e ’s self-view 
has been thought to increase the likelihood that one will 
perform similar acts in the future. However, initial 
compliance does not guarantee subsequent compliance except 
under circumstances in which one can make an inference for 
the initial compliance (Seligman, Bush, & Kirsch, 1976; 
Uranowitz, 1975). Furthermore, a change in self-perception 
should occur only in the absence of sufficient external 
justification for the initial response (Lepper, 1973). Many 
studies (Beaman, Svanum, Manlove, & Hampton, 1974; Freedman 
& Fraser, 1966; Pliner, Hart, Kohl, & S a a r i , 1974; Seligman 
et a l ., 1976; Snyder & Cunningham, 1975; Uranowitz, 1975) 
have provided results consistent with a change in 
self-perception as mediating the consistency between an 
individual’s response to the first request and the subsequent 
larger request.
5
The FITD paradigm. The basic FITD paradigm is comprised 
of two conditions. A group of subjects, the experimental 
group, is presented with a small initial request; one which
I
will produce compliance in a large percentage of the subjects. 
Following a delay, a large request is presented to the 
experimental subjects. A second group, known as the 
one-contact control group, receives only this large request, 
usually during the same time period in which the experimental 
group is receiving the large request. A FITD effect is 
obtained when the experimental group shows a significantly 
greater compliance rate to the large request than is obtained 
from the one-contact control group.
Empirical Studies of the FITD Phenomenon
Over the past two decades more than 50 studies using 
variations on the FITD paradigm have been conducted attempting 
to understand further what factors influence the FITD effect. 
Although many of these investigations have been based on 
hypotheses generated from self-perception theory, very few 
have suggested alternative explanations for the phenomenon.
Size of the first request. The size of the first request 
has been found to be an important factor in whether or not 
the FITD effect will be obtained. While the size of the 
initial request must be small enough to ensure obtaining 
compliance, consistent with the self-perception theory 
explanation, it must also be large enough to be seen as a 
meaningful activity for the effect to occur (DeJong, 1979;
6
Seligman et a l ., 1976). However, it has been shown (Baron, 
1973) that even when compliance with the first request is 
obtained, if the initial request is made too large, the 
likelihood of getting the FITD effect is decreased. Both 
Beaman et a l . (1983) and Miller and Suls (1977) suggested a
possible curvilinear relationship between the size of the 
initial request and compliance with the subsequent larger 
request.
Performance of the initial request. The FITD effect 
has been demonstrated both with subjects only agreeing to 
perform the initial act (passive compliance) and with 
subjects actively executing the first request (active 
compliance). According to Beaman et a l . (1983), both active
and passive compliance to the initial request produce the 
FITD effect, however, active participation produces somewhat 
greater effect sizes. This pattern of outcomes is consistent 
with a self-perception theory explanation for the FITD 
phenomenon.
Time between the first and second requests. The time 
between an initial request and the subsequent larger appeal 
has been varied from contiguous requests to a delay of 21 
days. Beaman et a l . (1983) reported that across studies the
average time delay was 4.4 days, and of "the 85 pure FITD 
conditions ...," they reviewed, "50% of the conditions were 
conducted with two days or less between requests" (p. 190).
Although most of the studies in the literature that
report a FITD effect involved some time delay between 
requests, there are a few investigations (C a n n , Sherman, & 
Elkes, 1975, Study 1; Hansen & Robinson, 1980; Harris,
1972, Study 1; Patch, 1986) employing contiguous requests 
that obtained significant compliance with the second request 
However, Beaman et a l . (1983) reported that they found,
across studies, a negative correlation between the 
percentage of compliance to the first request and the effect 
size when contiguous requests were presented to subjects. 
Addressing their finding, these authors pointed out that a 
time delay between requests was important for the FITD 
effect as it was originally conceptualized. The authors 
suggested further that a different psychological process is 
involved when requests are contiguous.
A self-perception theory explanation for the FITD effee 
might predict that some time is required between the two 
requests for the shift to occur in o n e ’s self-view that is 
thought to produce the compliance with the second larger 
request. With the exception of the Beaman et a l . (1988)
and the Cann et a l . (1975) studies, temporal delay as a
manipulated independent variable has not been studied and, 
instead, has varied unsystematically from study to study.
Noncompliance with the first request. Subjects who 
refuse to comply with an initial request have been found to 
be less likely to comply with a subsequent request. Snyder 
and Cunningham (1975) induced subjects either to comply or
not to comply with an initial request specifically to test 
the self-perception explanation for the FITD effect. These 
authors reasoned that individuals who do not comply with an 
initial request should infer that they are unhelpful 
individuals, and therefore are less likely to comply with a 
later request than control subjects who were not exposed to 
the initial request. Results of the Snyder and Cunningham 
study supported their position and the self-perception 
explanation for the FITD phenomenon.
Sex of the experimenter. The role that the sex of the 
experimenter might play in obtaining the FITD effect was 
studied as a variable in only one investigation (Baron, 1973). 
Baron found that when requests were presented by male 
experimenters a FITD effect was obtained but that this did 
not occur when female experimenters presented the same 
requests. Beaman et a l . (1983) analyzed the relationship
between the sex of the experimenter and the effect size 
obtained across FITD studies and found "that male experimenters 
produce larger effect sizes than female experimenters when 
interacting with either female subjects or a combination of 
female and male subjects” (p. 191). Addressing their
findings, these authors concluded that "the sex of the 
experimenter may play a more prominent role in obtaining 
results than has previously been acknowledged" (p. 192).
Ratio of the size of the first and second requests.
While the influence of the ratio of the size of the first
9
request to that of the subsequent larger request has not 
received attention as a manipulated independent variable, 
some authors (Foss & Dempsey, 1979; Seligman et a l ., 1976) 
have suggested that the relationship between the initial and 
critical request might be an important variable in producing 
the FITD effect. Although Seligman et a l . manipulated the 
size of the initial request and concluded that an optimal 
relationship existed between its size and compliance with 
the second request, they did not actually manipulate the 
ratio of the size of the first request to that of the 
second.
Foss and Dempsey (1979), using the FITD paradigm in an 
attempt to increase blood donations, when discussing their 
failure to obtain the FITD effect, pointed out that possibly 
a substantial first request is required to gain compliance 
with behaviors that individuals are hesitant to engage in. 
Although this suggestion may have merit, and would effectively 
reduce the ratio between the first and second requests, it 
might also decrease the rate of compliance to the initial 
request, and therefore the number of individuals who could 
potentially change their self-perceptions. Moreover, in 
the event that initial compliance is obtained with a larger 
first request, one might conceivably obtain the effect 
described by Baron (1973). He reported that some subjects, 
after complying with a moderately sized initial request, 
when asked to comply with the larger second request,
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explained "their refusal by stating that they had already 
'done enough’ for the E ’s organization,” (p. 114) and it
was unfair to ask them to do more. Furthermore, both Beaman 
et a l . (1983) and Miller and Suls (1977) have suggested that
a possible curvilinear relationship exists between the size 
of the initial request and compliance with the subsequent 
larger request.
Same or different requesters for the two requests. In 
their first investigation of the FITD phenomenon, Freedman 
and Fraser (1966, Study 1) used the same requester for both 
the initial request and the substantially larger second 
request which was presented after a three day delay. A 
compliance rate of over 50% was obtained for subjects who 
had performed the initial request. This was significantly 
more than the compliance rate of 22% which was obtained 
for individuals asked only to comply with the larger 
request. Because Freedman and Fraser were concerned that 
the high rate of compliance to the larger request that 
was obtained for their experimental subjects was due to 
a sense of commitment to the caller, they used different 
experimenters for each request in Study 2. These 
investigators still obtained a very large, and statistically 
significant compliance rate (76% vs. 16.7%) when the two 
requests involved a similar issue and a similar task.
Similarity in issues and tasks for the two requests. 
Freedman and Fraser (1966, Study 2) demonstrated that the
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strength of the FITD phenomenon did not depend on a subjects 
commitment to a certain issue or a particular task. When 
the two requests involved a similar issue and a similar 
task, when the two requests involved a similar issue but a 
dissimilar task, when the two requests involved different 
issues but a similar task, and when both the issue and the 
task were different, the FITD effect was obtained. Even 
though the condition of a similar issue with a similar task 
produced a compliance rate of 76%, this was not significantly 
different from the over 47% that was found in the other three 
conditions. It should be noted, however, that while the 
condition of a similar issue with a similar task produced a 
compliance rate that was significantly different (j><.01) 
from the 16.7% compliance rate which was demonstrated in 
the one-contact control group, the other three experimental 
conditions were only marginally significantly different 
(£<.07, £<.07, £<.08) from the one-contact control group.
Presence of external .iustification to comply. As a 
test of the self-perception explanation for the FITD 
phenomenon, a number of conceptually similar studies provided 
subjects with what they termed as either external pressure 
(DeJong & Funder, 1977; DeJong & Musilli, 1982) or external 
justification (Reingen & Kernan, 1977; Uranowitz, 1975; 
Zuckerman et a l ., 1979) for complying with the initial 
request. As noted previously, for a change to occur in 
o n e ’s self-image as a result of compliance with the initial
request, one needs to 
the situational context 
an absence of external 
situational context of 
an inference about personal 
in such a way as to be 
however, an individual 
or pressure that can be used 
in that particular situation, 
make any personal inference, 
sufficiently strong, what is 
effect (Lepper, 1973) can 
come to view themselves as 
for the performance of this 
As a consequence, subjects 
justification or pressure 
first request should 
rate for the second 
than that displayed 
external justification 
behavior.
Consistent with the 
for the FITD phenomenon, 
with a form of external 
monetary payment (Reingen & 
1979) or an external reason
her own behavior and 
occurs. If there is 
justification in the 
the individual makes 
attitudes, and beliefs 
the behavior. If, 
external justification 
explain his or her behavior 
the person is expected not to 
Moreover, if the pressure is 
termed an overjustification
and individuals may actually 
extrinsic motivation 
behavior (DeJong, 1979). 
provided with external 
compliance with the 
exhibit a compliance 
significantly lower 
did not experience the 
for their initial
explanation 
subjects 
of either a 
et a l .,
observe his or 
in which it 
pressure or 
the behavior, 
f eelings, 
consistent with 
experiences 
to
occ u r , 
requiring 
type of 
who are 
for their 
be expected to 
request that is 
by subjects who 
or pressure
self-perception theory 
studies which provided 
justification in terms
Kernan, 1977; Zuckerman 
(DeJong & Musilli, 1982;
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Uranowitz, 1975) demonstrated compliance rates for the second 
request or activity that were not significantly different 
from those of the one-contact control group. However, 
subjects performing the first request without external 
justification or pressure to explain their behavior were 
found to be significantly more helpful than those in the 
one-contact control group.
Effect of social labels on subsequent compliance. Bern 
(1972), when presenting his theory of self-perception, 
discussed the ontogeny of self-attribution and suggested 
that one learns the skill of self-description as a child 
when taught by others to differentiate between various 
objects, events, and internal states and to label these with 
distinct descriptors. When the skill of self-description 
has been learned, observing o n e ’s own behavior and the 
situational context in which it occurs should provide one 
with a more robust attitudinal inference than a label provided 
by another. However, in the appropriate circumstances, a 
label provided by another for o n e ’s behavior should continue 
to activate a self-perception evaluation (DeJong, 1979). 
Several studies have examined the effect of providing a 
subject with a prosocial label for his or her compliance with 
an initial request on the subject’s subsequent compliance 
(Eisenberg, Cialdini, McCreath, & Shell, 1987; Holte, 
Jamruszka, Gustafson, Beaman, & Camp, 1984; Kraut, 1973).
Kraut (1973) found that providing adult subjects with
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a prosocial label for compliance with an initial request, 
increased their rate of compliance with a subsequent request 
beyond that which was obtained from subjects who had not 
been supplied with the label (62% vs. 47%). Although 
K r aut’s finding was only marginally significant (p<.07), 
and his investigation was not designed to examine the FITD 
phenomenon, this study has been cited (DeJong, 1979) as 
supportive of a self-perception explanation for the FITD 
effect.
Holte et a l . (1984), in an investigation which was
designed to examine the influence of self-perception on the 
donating behavior of fourth-grade children, measured 
children’s self-perceptions as sharers and the accuracy of 
these self-perceptions prior to giving the children an 
initial opportunity to donate. Following the first donating 
opportunity, one group of children was provided with a label 
of being generous for its donating behavior. It was found 
that the children who had been labeled as generous, when 
given a second opportunity to donate, not only were more 
likely to donate, but also donated more than the control 
group. An important additional finding was that within the 
group that was labeled, it was the children who had 
accurately perceived themselves as nonsharers that were 
affected most by the label. These children gave significantly 
more the second time than labeled children who already viewed 
themselves accurately as sharers (92% vs. 56%). Although a
15
post-measure to assess a change in children’s self-perceptions 
was not obtained, the authors suggested that providing 
children who did not already view themselves as sharers 
with the self-perception of being generous changed their 
self-perception, and markedly influenced their donating 
behavior.
In an investigation that was designed to study the 
development in children of both an understanding of trait 
stability and their internal preference for consistency, 
and whether children’s preference for consistency produced 
a FITD effect, Eisenberg et a l . (1987) provided kindergarten,
second-grade, and fifth-grade children in one FITD condition 
with a helpful attribution for their initial compliance. 
Children in a second condition were provided with a positive 
but nonprosocial attribution for their initial behavior. 
Although second and fifth-grade children in both FITD 
conditions helped on a second task significantly more than 
the control group members, a significant difference in 
helping was not found between the groups which had been 
subjected to the two different attribution manipulations.
Even though Eisenberg et a l . (1987) did not address the
finding of a lack of differentiation between their attribution 
conditions with respect to the FITD effect, it could be argued 
that this result would support a self-perception theory 
explanation for the phenomenon. Both self-perception theory 
and prior research (DeJong, 1979; Holte et a l ., 1984; Kraut,
16
1973) would predict that a label provided by another for 
o n e ’s behavior should activate a self-perception evaluation 
that influences o n e ’s subsequent behavior. If the FITD 
effect is mediated by a similar process, it would seem 
reasonable to assume, under circumstances when internal cues 
for o n e ’s behavior are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable, 
both the observation of o n e ’s own act of compliance with an 
initial request and the providing of a prosocial label for 
this act by another should generate a similar change in o n e ’s 
self-perception. Thus, individuals who comply with a small 
initial request in a FITD study would not require a label 
provided by another to alter their self-view, and the results 
that were reported by Eisenberg et a l . with regard to their 
attribution manipulation should be expected.
The Eisenberg et a l . (1987) study is important for a
number of reasons. First, this study demonstrated that a 
response to the FITD manipulation began to appear with 
children 7 to 8 years of age who showed an understanding of 
trait stability, as measured by the Cognitive Understanding 
of Traits Scale, as a predictor of behavior. Second, along 
with an understanding of trait stability, it was found that 
a child’s preference for consistency in behavior, as 
measured by the Self/Adult Preference for Consistency Scale, 
significantly influenced the strength of the FITD effect.
In addition, a measure of self-attribution administered to 
the second and fifth-grade children two months following
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the FITD manipulation demonstrated that children in both 
attribution conditions tended to attribute prosocial motives 
to their helping acts. Furthermore, of children in the 
control group who were found to value behavioral consistency, 
those who had helped on the second task in the absence of 
an experimenter also attributed their helping to prosocial 
motives, whereas those who had helped others in the presence 
of the experimenter gave nonprosocial self-attributions for 
their helping.
In addition to presenting support for a self-perception 
explanation for the FITD effect, the Eisenberg et a l . (1987)
investigation found that the strength of the FITD phenomenon 
was significantly affected by a child’s preference for 
consistency. It was suggested by the authors that an 
internal preference for consistency may be the link between 
the change in self-perception which occurs as a result of 
compliance with an initial request and subsequent consistent 
responding.
Alternative explanations. Over the years few alternative 
explanations have been considered for the FITD effect.
Those that have been proposed such as social reinforcement 
of the initial compliant act (Crano & Sivacek, 1982; Harris, 
1972), a redefinition of o n e ’s adaptation level (Snyder & 
Cunningham, 1975), a change in situational perceptions 
(Rittle, 1981), the salience of social norms for helping 
(Harris, 1972), and informational availability (Tybout,
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Sternthal, & Calder, 1983) have either been unsupported with 
empirical investigation, or when supported, found to be 
"inadequate accounts of the foot-in-the-door literature" 
(DeJong, 1979, p. 2237).
As noted previously, the self-perception theory 
explanation for the FITD effect has been commonly accepted. 
However, no published investigation has provided direct 
evidence for this account by measuring the change in 
self-perception that is thought to occur as a result of 
either active or passive compliance with the small first 
request. Although DeJong (1979) stated that "the 
self-perception analysis has proven to be a heuristic 
explanation" (p. 2235), both his literature review and 
the Beaman et a l . (1983) meta-analysis study indicated that
self-perception theory did not entirely address the 
underlying process that is thought to occur and, as a 
result, it was suggested that more research and theorizing 
be d o n e .
Although the FITD effect has been thought to be mediated 
by a cognitive change which occurs as a consequence of o n e ’s 
self-perception of his or her compliance with the initial 
small request, it may be that obtaining the effect depends on 
o n e ’s original se1f-perception. For example, some individuals 
may view themselves as neither helpful nor unhelpful. When 
induced to comply with the initial request, these individuals 
may make an attitudinal inference related to their behavior
19
and come to incorporate being helpful into their self-images. 
As a result, when given a subsequent opportunity to be 
helpful, these individuals should be willing to help another. 
Such reasoning is consistent with the Holte et a l . (1984)
study, described earlier, which demonstrated that children 
who accurately perceived themselves as nonsharers were 
responsible for the significant difference in donating 
behavior that was found between the experimental and control 
groups.
Moreover, individuals who already have very strong 
self-perceptions of being helpful people should not be 
expected to be affected by a FITD manipulation within the 
self-perception theory explanation for the effect. That is, 
compliance with an initial small request should not produce a 
cognitive change in individuals who originally view themselves 
as helpful. Therefore, the compliance rate with a large 
request for helpful people would not be dependent on whether 
they complied with an initial small request but, instead, on 
their original self-view.
Furthermore, individuals who strongly conceptualize 
themselves as unhelpful people should not be expected to 
be affected by a manipulation as minor as the initial request. 
It may be that these are the individuals that constitute the 
minority of subjects one finds when doing a FITD study who 
refuse to comply with the small first request.
As was noted earlier, Freedman and Fraser (1966)
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demonstrated the FITD effect to be a robust phenomenon, and 
yet the Beaman et a l . (1983) meta-analysis concluded that
the effect is weaker than has been assumed. It is possible 
that since the time of the original Freedman and Fraser 
study more people have come to view themselves as helpful.
If this were true, then in a random sample one would find 
a preponderance of people who hold a self-perception of 
themselves as helpful. Based on this reasoning, it is 
possible that only a minority of subjects would be affected 
by a FITD manipulation.
During the last decade, social cognition, the study of 
the normal cognitive structures and processes by which 
individuals come to understand themselves and others (Fiske 
& Taylor, 1984), has become a prominent area of research 
within social psychology. An important cognitive structure, 
a hypothetical construct known as a self-schema, could 
account for the findings in the FITD literature and support 
the reasoning developed above.
Schema Theory and Social Cognition
Although schema theory can be traced historically to 
the work of Bartlett which was published in 1932, modern 
schema theory began to emerge in the early part of 1970.
By 1975, there was a noteworthy convergence of published 
papers from investigators in diverse areas of research 
(e.g., artificial intelligence, motor performance, cognitive 
psychology, and linguistics) which all argued for a schema
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theory approach to information processing (Brewer &
Nakamura, 1987).
The study of social cognition within social psychology 
emerged as a direct result of the development of theories 
and methods in cognitive psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Since its onset, much research in social cognition has focused 
on understanding the cognitive structures that affect an 
individual’s attempt to organize, summarize, or explain his 
or her own behavior and the behavior of others. Today, 
"schema" is the term most frequently used when one is 
denoting a cognitive structure.
Description of schemata. Schemata are hypothetical 
cognitive structures which guide the perception, organization, 
processing, and utilization of incoming information or 
stimuli (Burger, 1986). Schemata are thought to consist of 
clusters representing conceptually related knowledge, 
attitudes, and beliefs about persons, objects, situations, 
actions, events, and sequences of events, and develop from 
the cognitive processing of information derived from o n e ’s 
past experiences (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Schemata can 
contain the attributes which are related to a particular 
organized representation, the rules which define the 
relationship among the attributes, or both (Fiske & Taylor, 
1984; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Our memory system is assumed 
to contain a countless number of schemata, and it is this 
"organized prior knowledge [which] enables us to function
in a social world that would otherwise be of paralyzing 
complexity" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 149).
The properties of an individual's schemata are thought 
to influence what information one will attend to, and how 
this information will be encoded, organized, remembered, 
and retrieved for utilization. "In the most general sense 
[schemata] provide for the construction of social reality" 
(Markus & Zajonc, 1985, p. 143).
Schemata function to simplify input by reducing the 
amount of environmental stimuli that a perceiver attends 
to, and they serve as interpretive frameworks for new 
information (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Actively interacting 
with incoming data (Brewer & Nakamura, 1987), schemata 
determine how new information is assimilated with existing 
knowledge and how the information will be represented in 
memory (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). When an environmental 
stimulus is impoverished, schemata function to fill in 
information which is lacking in the specific input thus 
allowing the perceiver to process information beyond that 
which was actually present (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus & 
Zajonc, 1985). In addition, at output, by having interacted 
with incoming information, schemata allow the perceiver to 
respond appropriately to a countless number of new situations 
(Brewer & Nakamura, 1987).
Schemata studied within social cognition. Research in 
social cognition has focused on four types of social schemata
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person schemata, role schemata, event schemata, and 
self-schemata (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Person schemata 
determine how we categorize and understand others. Knowledge 
about broad social categories (e.g., sex, age, race, 
occupation) are encompassed in role schemata. Event schemata 
consist of our knowledge about sequences of situational 
events, and self-schemata contain o n e ’s general knowledge 
about the self. Because the properties of person schemata, 
role schemata, and event schemata are not being investigated 
in this thesis, only the characteristics of self-schemata 
are addressed.
Self-schemata. The cognitive structures which represent 
how the self is classified in memory are called self-schemata. 
Markus (1977) coined this term when making one of the first 
attempts to measure individual differences in the processing 
of schematic information about the self. According to 
Markus, "self-schemata are cognitive generalizations about 
the self, derived from past experience, that organize and 
guide the processing of self-related information contained 
in the individual's social experiences" (p. 64).
Individuals categorize information about themselves 
from past experiences with specific events and from the 
evaluations of their behavior by themselves and others in 
specific situations (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Through the 
process of repeated categorizations and evaluation, general 
representations of self-relevant knowledge are produced in
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memory (Markus, 1977; Markus, Hamill, & Sentis, 1987).
Once formed, "these schemata function as selective mechanisms 
which determine whether information is attended to, how it 
is structured, how much importance is attached to it, and 
what happens to it subsequently" (Markus, 1977, p. 64).
Because self-schemata are developed from cognitive 
representations of past experiences and because people 
differ in their past experiences, the categorizations that 
are made will also differ thus producing individual 
differences in self-schemata (Markus, 1977). As a result, 
some individuals will have a strong conception of themselves 
on certain attributes, while others may possess a weaker 
self-schema for the same domain (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Moreover, other individuals may not develop a differentiated 
self-view related to the domain, and will therefore be 
considered aschematic (without a schema) for that domain 
(Markus, 1977). In general, individuals will possess 
self-schemata for domains they judge as important to 
themselves, on which they consider themselves to be extreme, 
and for which they are confident that the converse does not 
apply (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
Even though an individual may possess many well 
developed self-schemata, not all are equally salient at any 
given moment (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). 
Context is thought to be a major factor in determining which 
of o n e ’s self-schemata will be activated (Fiske & Taylor,
1984). However, how recently a schema has been activated, 
and how frequently it has been applied in the past, partially 
determine whether a given schema will be activated in a 
particular situation. In addition, o n e ’s affect and 
motivation can determine schema accessibility. For instance, 
"unmet needs can prime o n e ’s interpretation of ambiguous 
stimuli" and ’’highly emotional schemata should be more 
accessible than neutral ones" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 176).
Self-schemata perform functions similar to those of 
other types of schemata; however, their structure is thought 
to be more complex. Self-schemata filter incoming environment 
information. A perceiver will attend to information that is 
self-relevant while ignoring that which is irrelevant to his 
or her self-view. Information that is consistent with o n e ’s 
prevailing self-schema will not only receive attention, but 
will also be processed rapidly and recalled easily (Markus, 
1977; Markus & Zajonc, 1985) because the incoming information 
already exists within o n e ’s knowledge structure.
On the other hand, a perceiver may or may not attend to 
self-relevant information that is inconsistent with his or 
her self-concept (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Markus & Zajonc,
1985). It is thought that individuals will generally ignore 
conflicting information that is not highly contradictory. 
However, if the inconsistent information does receive 
attention, it may be reinterpreted and assimilated to fit the 
prevailing schema thus becoming part of o n e ’s dispositions
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and easily remembered (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). Or, the 
information may be attributed to a temporary situational 
cause which would make it irrelevant and easily forgotten 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1984). As a result, schemata are permitted 
to function unchanged even in the face of contradictory 
inf ormation.
Even though schemata are resistant to change, they do 
change under certain circumstances. According to Fiske & 
Taylor (1984), "discrepant information is most likely to 
cause schema change when the lack of fit is undeniable, 
that is, [if the lack of fit is] considerable, unambiguous, 
memorable, and stable" (p. 178). Moreover, if one is faced
with a series of instances where information is somewhat 
discrepant with a prevailing schema, the schema may eventually 
change.
Generally, knowledge about the self is easily accessible 
in memory. It is o n e ’s self-schemata that assist an 
individual with remembering self-relevant information. 
Individuals who possess a self-schema for a particular 
domain can be expected to make judgments about themselves 
related to the domain rapidly and with consistency (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). Individuals who are aschematic with respect 
to a particular domain of behavior, when asked to do so, 
will also make judgments about themselves with regard to 
the domain. However, their judgments will be made more 
slowly and will be less consistent (i.e., will include
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adjectives that describe both poles of a bi-polar dimension 
of behavior). Schematic individuals are able to generate 
evidence in support of their judgments, remembering, in 
detail, examples of domain-related behavior. On the other 
hand, examples produced by aschematics, if generated at 
all, will be fewer in number and lacking in detail.
When asked to predict their behavior, schematics will 
make rapid predictions consistent with their self-schema. 
However, if the situation is novel, schematics may lengthen 
their processing time because they have considerable knowledge 
to apply to the novel situation (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Aschematics will also predict their behavior for the domain 
but, because they have less information on which to base 
their judgments, they will process routine information more 
slowly and novel information more rapidly.
Empirical Studies in Support of the Self-Schema Construct
In 1977, Markus operationally defined the concept of a 
self-schema and provided evidence in support of individual 
differences in the processing of self-relevant information.
The emphasis of Ma r k u s ’s seminal work " was less on the 
content of the schemas and more on their selective function 
in the information-processing sequence" (Markus & Zajonc,
1985, p. 146). Using independence/dependence as the 
dimension of behavior, Markus identified three groups of 
subjects (schematic independent, schematic dependent, and 
those aschematic with respect to this domain) and found
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that the groups differentially processed self-relevant 
information related to the domain. It was Markus's 
conjecture that "all self-schemas would operate in a fairly 
similar way regardless of content" (Markus & Zajonc, 1985, 
p. 146), and this assumption has been supported by 
subsequent research (Bern, 1981; Davis & Unruh, 1981; H a m m e n , 
Marks, deMayo, & M a yol, 1985; Kuiper, Derry, & MacDonald,
1982; Markus, Crane, Bernstein, & Siladi, 1982; Markus et 
al., 1987; Miller, 1984; Mills, 1983; Strube et a l ., 1986).
The importance of individual differences in the 
processing of self-relevant information has been demonstrated 
for a variety of domains. Markus (1977) identified subjects 
who were schematic and aschematic on the trait dimension of 
independence/dependence and compared their performance on 
an assortment of tasks. She found systematic variations 
in performance between the groups.
Schematic processing of self-relevant information 
related to gender has received attention by a number of 
investigators (Bern, 1981; Markus et a l ., 1982; Miller, 1984; 
Mills, 1983). Although gender is considered a universal 
schema (i.e., one that everyone possesses to some degree), 
it was found that not all individuals had an elaborated 
masculine or feminine self-schema. Those that do not are 
considered to be aschematic with respect to gender.
However some individuals, labeled as androgynous, view 
themselves as both masculine and feminine and their
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self-concept would be considered to "have multiple gender 
self-schemas" (Markus et a l ., 1982, p. 50).
Markus has also examined the schematic processing of 
information related to body weight (Markus et a l ., 1987).
She found that some individuals organized self-knowledge 
with respect to their body weight while others did not.
Other investigators have also examined self-schemata.
For example, Strube et a l . (1986) examined the cognitive
performance of individuals who manifested either Type A or 
Type B behavior patterns. The results of their study 
demonstrated differential organizations of responses which 
corresponded to the differing behavior styles. The authors 
suggested “that the Type A and B domains may represent 
distinctly organized content clusters that can be represented 
independently as self-schemata" (p. 176). A number of
studies have examined the processing of self-relevant 
information by depressed people (Davis & U n r u h , 1981; Hammen 
et a l ., 1985; Kuiper et a l ., 1982). Results suggested that 
when individuals are depressed they process self-relevant 
information through a depressive self-schema.
Self-schemata and the Foot-in-the-Door Phenomenon
The FITD phenomenon has been thought to be mediated by 
a cognitive change which occurs as a consequence of o n e ’s 
self-perception of his or her compliance with an initial 
small request. Many studies have been conducted that 
support a self-perception theory explanation for the effect.
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and yet the nature of the cognitive change that is thought 
to occur has not been addressed. Modern schema theory, 
specifically the self-schema construct, may offer such an 
explanation.
Bern (1972) has argued that a change in self-perception 
occurs in situations where an individual has weak, ambiguous, 
or uninterpretable internal cues for his or her behavior. 
Schema theory would predict that individuals who possess a 
self-schema for domains of behavior such as helpfulness and 
unhelpfulness should be expected to have well developed 
cognitive representations of themselves on these dimensions 
that are highly resistant to change. Therefore, individuals 
who have a self-schema for the domains of helpfulness or 
unhelpfulness should not be expected to alter their 
self-image as a result of a FITD manipulation. That is, 
individuals who already view themselves as helpful people 
when complying with a small request would continue to 
consider themselves helpful people. Furthermore, individuals 
who possess an unhelpful self-schema, even if they do comply 
with a small request, should not be expected to be affected 
by their behavior which is related to a request as trivial 
as that which occurs in a FITD paradigm. Therefore, only 
aschematic individuals, those who do not possess a self-schema 
for the helpfulness/unhelpfulness dimension, should require 
an explanation for their compliance with a small request.
Schema theory would predict that the internal cues for
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the helping behavior of aschematic helpful/unhelpful 
individuals should be weak, or ambiguous, or uninterpretable. 
Consistent with self-perception theory, when helping another, 
these individuals should find themselves in the position of 
an outside observer when attempting to understand their 
helping behavior. Therefore, it would be expected that 
when viewing their behavior and the situation in which it 
occurs, aschematic helpful/unhelpful individuals should 
infer that they are helpful people and thereby change their 
self-perception. As a result, these previously aschematic 
individuals should be found to increase significantly 
the compliance rate to the large request in a FITD paradigm. 
The purpose of this research is to examine this possibility.
In addition, it may be that some aschematic 
helpful/unhelpful people would be more likely than others 
to infer the existence of a helpful disposition from the 
observation of their behavior related to the small request.
As was noted previously, individuals possess self-schemata 
on domains they judge as important to themselves. Perhaps, 
to recognize the significance of their behavior related to 
a small request and to classify it as an example of a 
helpful act, it is necessary for aschematic helpful/unhelpful 
individuals to place some degree of value or importance 
on the concept of a helpful person. The second purpose of 
this investigation is to explore this possibility by 
separating aschematic individuals into two groups: an
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"aschematic important" group; an "aschematic unimportant" 
group. The two groups would be similar in that both 
consist of individuals who rate themselves in the midrange 
on a helpful/unhelpful scale (i.e., rate themselves as 
neither helpful nor unhelpful). They would differ from 
each other by their ratings on a scale that measures the 
importance of the characteristic of helpfulness to their 
self-view. Individuals would be assigned to the aschematic 
important group if they rate themselves above the median 
on the importance scale and to the aschematic unimportant 
group if they rate themselves below the median. Aschematic 
important group members would be expected to attend to 
their behavior when complying with an initial small request, 
categorize it as a helpful act, and infer that they are 
helpful people whereas aschematic unimportant group members 
should n o t .
Hypotheses
It is proposed that individuals who possess a helpful 
self-schema will not be affected by a FITD manipulation.
That is, the compliance rate to a large request for 
self-schema helpful experimental subjects will not differ 
significantly from that obtained for self-schema helpful 
individuals not exposed to an initial small request. Also, 
experimental subjects who possess an unhelpful self-schema 
will demonstrate a compliance rate to a large request that 
does not differ significantly from that obtained for other
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self-schema unhelpful individuals who were not exposed to 
the experimental manipulation.
It is proposed that the presence or absence of a 
self-schema for the dimension of helpfulness/unhelpfulness 
determines whether a FITD effect will be obtained within 
a FITD paradigm. Only those individuals who are aschematic 
with respect to the domain, who view themselves as neither 
helpful nor unhelpful, will be affected by a FITD 
manipulation. In addition, it is expected that aschematic 
experimental subjects who view helping as an important 
characteristic will demonstrate this increased compliance 
rate to the larger request while aschematic experimental 
subjects who view helping as unimportant to their self-view 
wi11 n o t .
Because self-schematic helpful and unhelpful subjects 
should be expected to comply with both the small and large 
requests in accordance with their self-schema, several 
secondary hypotheses are proposed. Self-schematic helpful 
subjects will demonstrate a compliance rate to the initial 
request that is significantly higher than that demonstrated 
by experimental aschematic subjects, and self-schematic 
unhelpful subjects will demonstrate a compliance rate for 
the initial request that is significantly lower than that 
displayed by the experimental aschematic subjects. In 
addition, compliance to the large request for schematic 
one-contact control subjects should also reflect their
self-schema. Therefore, it is proposed that the self-schema 
helpful one-contact control group will demonstrate a 
compliance rate to the large request that is significantly 
higher than that displayed by the aschematic one-contact 
control group, and the self-schema unhelpful one-contact 
control group will demonstrate a compliance rate to the 
large request that is significantly lower than that 
demonstrated by the aschematic one-contact control group.
CHAPTER 2
Study
This study investigated the possible attenuating effects 
that schematicity for helpfulness or unhelpfulness produce 
on the FITD phenomenon. The FITD effect is thought to be 
mediated by a cognitive change that occurs as a result 
of o n e ’s self-perception related to his or her compliance 
with an initial small request. Bern (1972) has argued that 
individuals function as outside observers of their own 
behavior in situations where internal cues for the behavior 
are weak, ambiguous, or uninterpretable. Inferences that 
occur as a result of these observations are thought to 
produce a change in o n e ’s self-perception so that o n e ’s 
self-image and behavior correspond. In chapter one, it was 
argued that individuals with a well defined self-schema with 
respect to the dimension of helpfulness/unhelpfulness should 
not require an explanation for their compliance or noncompliance 
with a small request. Given this expectation, individuals 
schematic with respect to the domain would not demonstrate an 
increased compliance rate to a larger request when compared 
with a respective one-contact control group. On the other 
hand, individuals aschematic with respect to the domain 
should find that their compliance with a small request would 
require some explanation and should, as a result, come to 
infer that they are helpful people. When given another
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opportunity to help, aschematic individuals would be 
expected to demonstrate a higher rate of helping than that 
found for a respective one-contact control group.
Method
Subjects and Overview
To obtain a classification of each subject’s self-schema 
on the dimension of helpfulness/unhelpfulness, a questionnaire 
was administered to 623 students during a routine group 
testing session. Because of the procedure required for this 
study, students were neither informed of the purpose of this 
questionnaire nor that they might be selected to participate 
in an experiment. Students were selected as potential 
subjects if they met the criteria for inclusion in one of 
four groups, two of which were schematic and two of which 
were aschematic, and had listed a home telephone number on 
their questionnaire. Following the selection process, each 
group was divided such that approximately one half was 
designated to receive multiple requests in a FITD paradigm 
and the other half was designated to serve as one-contact 
control group members. This process produced a 
2 (experimental vs. control) X 4 (classification of 
schematicity) design.
Between three and six weeks following completion of 
their questionnaires, experimental subjects were called at 
home and asked to comply with a small request. Two to 
four days later both the experimental subjects and a nearly
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equal number of similarly classified one-contact control 
group members were called and asked to perform a larger 
reques t .
Measurement of Schematicity
Students in introductory psychology classes were asked 
to rate themselves on 15-point scales that were designed to 
assess how helpful they viewed themselves, how confident 
they felt in their self-assessment, and how important this 
assessment was to their self-image (Appendix A). Scales for 
the adjectives generous, friendly, and understanding were 
also included on the self-rating questionnaire to mask the 
importance of the questions related to helpfulness.
To begin the selection of individuals for each of the 
four groups, the distribution of the 15-point helpfulness 
scale was divided into three parts based on the closest 
meaningful approximation of thirds. Scores of 13 through 
15 were selected to represent the highest self-ratings 
on the helpfulness scale. This range encompassed 38% 
of the scores on this measure. Scores of 11 and 12 were 
chosen to represent the middle 33% of the scores. The 
range of 3 through 10, which contained the remaining 28% 
of the scores, was designated to represent the lowest 
self-ratings on the helpfulness scale. For each of the 
three divisions (i.e., the highest, middle, and lowest 
groups on the helpfulness measure), a separate distribution 
of scores was made for the importance scale; however, for
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the confidence scale scores, a separate distribution was 
made for only the highest and lowest groups. Based on 
the various distributions, individuals were selected as 
potential subjects for the following four categories:
Self-schema helpful. To identify subjects for the 
"self-schema helpful" category, individuals were considered 
if their helpfulness scale scores were included in the range 
of 13 through 15. A distribution of self-rating scores was 
then formed for the confidence and importance scales for 
these individuals. An individual was selected as a potential 
subject if he or she had a helpfulness measure score in 
the range of 13 through 15, an importance scale score above 
its distribution median of 13, and a confidence measure
1
score that was equal to or greater than its median of 14 .
This process identified 96 potential self-schema helpful 
subjects: Those who had some of the highest self-reported
helpfulness scores and who indicated, relative to other 
similar people, they viewed their helpfulness characteristic 
as quite important and were confident in their self-assessment. 
Following classification, individuals were randomly 
assigned either to the experimental group or to the 
one-contact control group.
Self-schema unhelpful. To identify "self-schema 
unhelpful" subjects, individuals who rated themselves at the 
low end of the helpfulness scale with scores between 3 and 10 
were selected for evaluation. For this group of individuals.
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a distribution of the self-rating scores was formed for
both the confidence and the importance scale. An individual 
was selected as a potential subject if he or she had a
helpfulness measure score in the range of 3 through 10,
2
an importance scale score equal to or greater than 9 and
a confidence scale score equal to or greater than this groups’ 
3
median of 10 . This process identified 85 potential 
self-schema unhelpful subjects: Those who had some of the
lowest self-reported helpfulness scores and who indicated, 
relative to other similar people, they viewed their unhelpful 
characteristic as quite important and were confident in 
their self-assessment. Following classification, individuals 
were randomly assigned either to the experimental group or 
to the one-contact control group.
Aschematic for helpful, important. To identify 
"aschematic for helpful, important" subjects, individuals were 
considered for this classification if they rated themselves 
at either 11 or 12 on the helpfulness scale. A distribution 
of scores was then formed for this g r oup’s importance scale 
scores. An individual was selected as a potential subject 
for this category if he or she had both a helpfulness measure 
score of 11 or 12 and an importance scale score that was 
above this gro u p ’s median of 12. This process identified 70 
aschematic for helpful, important people who characterized 
themselves as neither helpful nor unhelpful, and indicated 
relative to other similar people, that helpfulness was 
important to their self-assessment. Following classification
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individuals were assigned randomly either to the experimental 
group or to the one-contact control group. Because it was 
unclear how confident aschematic individuals should be in 
their self-assessment, the confidence distribution was not 
used for this classification.
Aschematic for helpful, unimportant. To identify 
"aschematic for helpful, unimportant" subjects, individuals 
were considered for this classification if they rated 
themselves at either 11 or 12 on the helpfulness scale and 
if their importance scale score was below this g r oup’s 
median of 12. This process identified 86 aschematic for 
helpful, unimportant individuals who characterized themselves 
as neither helpful nor unhelpful and indicated, relative 
to other similar people, that this domain was unimportant 
to their self-images. Again, because it was unclear how 
confident aschematic individuals should be in their 
self-assessment, the confidence distribution was not used 
for this categorization. Following classification, 
individuals were assigned randomly either to the experimental 
group or to the one-contact control group.
Procedure
Between three and six weeks following participation in 
the questionnaire phase of this experiment, subjects assigned 
to the four multiple request groups were called and asked to 
perform a small request by one of four female undergraduate 
psychology majors serving as experimenters. All four were
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blind to subject classification and to the hypotheses being 
tested. Each experimenter was given a list of names and 
telephone numbers which was compiled from each of the four 
experimental conditions. An effort was made to construct 
the lists so that equal numbers of subjects from each of 
the four experimental conditions were contacted by each of 
the experimenters during the four weeks.
To make the small request, experimenters called subjects 
at their homes between Sunday and Tuesday during the times 
the individuals had indicated on their questionnaires as a 
good time to be contacted. If a subject could not be 
reached, the caller made at least four more attempts at 
other times. When subjects were reached, they were 
identified by name and then presented with the following 
script which constituted the small request:
Hello. My name is Ann Myers. I am with the Bureau 
of Community Services. We are conducting a survey of 
university students concerning their use of community 
recreational facilities. Would you be willing to help 
us by answering a number of questions for our survey 
that will take only a couple of minutes?
If a subject refused, he or she was thanked for his or 
her time. When subjects agreed, they were asked the questions 
(Appendix B) and were then told "you’ve been very helpful" 
before being thanked for their participation in the survey.
The experimenters noted whether subjects complied with the
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small request.
Two to four days after the initial call, experimental 
subjects and an equal number of similarly classified (in 
terms of schematicity) one-contact control group members 
were telephoned and asked to perform a larger request. The 
experimenters for this phase of the study were the same 
four female undergraduate psychology majors used to make 
the initial request. Each experimenter was given a list of 
names and telephone numbers of experimental subjects who had 
been contacted previously for the first request. Names of 
experimental subjects were mixed with equal numbers of names 
of one-contact control group members selected randomly from 
each of the four groups. For every experimental subject 
contacted during a particular calling period of Tuesday 
through Friday, an attempt was made to contact a one-contact 
control group member. This procedure ensured that historical 
events did not differentially impact experimental and control 
group members. If an individual could not be reached, the 
caller made four more attempts at other times. No 
experimenter received the name of a subject whom she had 
previously called. In addition, the experimenters were 
blind to an individual’s classification, his or her FITD 
condition and to any responses previously made.
When an individual was reached, the experimenter 
identified the person by name and then presented the 
following large request:
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Hello. I ’m Sue Daniels. I am working for the Research 
firm of Petty, Petty and Barker. We are conducting 
research at the University of Montana collecting 
information concerning student’s views of university 
funding and other political issues. We are asking 
University of Montana students to help by responding 
to questions for a 2 to 3 hour period. Would you 
be willing to come to our office on the U. M. campus 
and take 2 to 3 hours to be interviewed and answer 
written questions related to our project?
If the person refused to participate, he or she was thanked 
for his or her time. When individuals agreed to the large 
request, they were told the following:
Since you will want to schedule the 2 to 3 hours at 
a time convenient for you, I will give you the phone 
number of our appointment secretary.
The person was given a telephone number to call, a list of 
days and times when someone was available to take the call 
and was thanked for his or her willingness to help (see 
Appendix C). The experimenter noted each individual’s 
response to the large request.
During the prearranged days and times, an experimenter 
was available to take telephone calls from those wanting to 
arrange for an appointment. The experimenter followed a 
written script (Appendix D) when answering the calls, 
noting the name of each person that called. Calling for
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an appointment constituted the behavioral measure of 
compliance with the large request.
Because the FITD effect is dependent on compliance with
an initial small request, it was important to ensure that an
adequate number of subjects would be willing to comply with 
this initial appeal. Therefore, the small request was tested 
by telephoning 25 students who were selected randomly from 
those individuals who had completed the questionnaire but 
who had not been selected as subjects. The compliance rate 
with the small request was found to be 100%.
To ensure that the large request was of sufficient size
to be considered a large request, another 25 students were
telephoned and presented with the request. These individuals 
were selected randomly from those who had completed the 
screening questionnaire but who had been neither selected 
as subjects nor selected to test the smaller request.
Ideally, large requests in a FITD paradigm should 
generate a compliance rate of approximately 20%. This is 
consistent with the literature and can conceptually be 
considered a large request. For this study, pretesting of 
the large request indicated that 28% of those who were 
called agreed to comply. This percentage was deemed close 
enough to what was intended to continue with the large 
request as originally planned. Unfortunately, it was 
discovered during the course of the main study that one of 
the experimenters was providing counterfeit data. When
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this was removed, it was found that base rate compliance 
with the large request may have been as high as 35% which 
was greater than what was intended.
CHAPTER 3
Results
The results of this experiment are reported in two 
sections. The first section discusses the primary set of 
analyses which were conducted to determine whether a FITD 
effect was obtained and, if so, in which conditions.
Section two details the secondary analyses which were 
performed.
Because the Beaman et a l . (1983) meta-analysis study
reported a weak mean effect size for the FITD phenomenon, 
an effort was made to increase the power of this experiment, 
(in addition to striving to maintain adequate cases in each 
of the cells), by selecting an a priori probability level 
of 0.10 as the alpha level for each of the analyses. Thus 
an outcome with a probability of 0.10 or less would allow 
for rejection of a null hypothesis that chance alone was 
responsible for the obtained result.
In addition, the analyses described in the two sections 
constitute a family of planned comparisons. Because a series 
of comparisons on a set of data can increase the family-wise 
error rate (i.e., the number of Type I errors), the Bonferroni 
inequality was used to adjust for this possibility. This 
procedure increased the critical value that each of the 
test statistics was required to equal or exceed for a null 
hypothesis to be rejected. Because of the unavailability
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of a table for critical values for Bonferroni tests at an 
alpha level of 0.10, a table of values was constructed 
(J. A. Walsh, personal communication, October 14, 1993) by
interpolation (see Appendix E) from those existing for an 
alpha level of 0.05 (Dayton & Schafer, 1973). Although 
the critical values for Bonferroni tests are not quite 
linear in their progression, it was decided that for the 
purpose of this study the table would provide for an 
acceptable estimation of equally weighted critical values 
for an alpha level of 0.10.
Primary Analyses
Prior to conducting the family of planned comparisons, 
an overall chi-square analysis was performed to evaluate 
the rate of verbal compliance with the large request.
This 2 (experimental vs. control) X 2 (compliance vs. 
noncompliance) chi-square analysis with the Yates correction 
for continuity and with one degree of freedom was performed 
to test the null hypothesis that no relationship existed 
between compliance as a function of experimental treatment.
It was expected that the null hypothesis would be rejected 
and the alternative hypothesis that there was a relationship 
between compliance to the large request and condition would 
be supported. Although a directional prediction was not 
made, it was anticipated that the results of this analysis 
would indicate a FITD effect had been achieved. Surprisingly, 
it was found that the experimental group was significantly
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less likely to agree to comply with the large request than 
was the one-contact control group, thus demonstrating a 
strong reversal of the FITD effect. As Table 1 indicates,
23% (33 of 145) of the experimental subjects verbally 
complied with the large request, while nearly 46% (66 of 145) 
of the one-contact control subjects said they would comply, 
y X  1, n = 290) = 15.70, critical value = 6.7. Because 
so few individuals who agreed to comply with the large 
request actually called for an appointment, 3% (3 of 99), 
no analyses of behavioral compliance were conducted.
Because the overall chi-square analysis revealed a 
significant reversal of the FITD effect rather than its 
absence, it was appropriate for the originally planned series 
of comparisons to be made to test the remaining hypotheses.
The first hypothesis, that individuals who are schematic 
with respect to helpfulness would not be affected by the 
FITD manipulation, was tested using a chi-square analysis 
with the Yates correction for continuity. The frequency of 
agreeing to comply with the large request for the self-schema 
helpful experimental group was compared to that which 
was obtained for its one-contact control group. This 
2 (experimental vs. control) X 2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) 
chi-square analysis with one degree of freedom was expected 
to be nonsignificant. Because a difference between groups 
was not expected, a two-tailed test was selected. As 
predicted, for verbal compliance with the large request, a
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Table 1
Overall Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request
Yes No n
Experimental Groups 33 112 145
23% 77%
One-Contact Control Groups 66 79 145
46% 54%
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significant difference was not found between the experimental 
group and the one-contact control group. As shown in Table 2, 
24% (10 of 42) of the experimental subjects said yes to the 
large request and 50% (21 of 42) of the one-contact control 
group members also agreed to comply, 1 & 1 ,  n = 84) = 5.11, 
critical value = 6.7.
To test the hypothesis that the frequency of agreeing to 
comply with the large request for the self-schema unhelpful 
experimental group would not differ significantly from that 
obtained for its respective control group, a 2 (experimental 
vs. control) X 2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) chi-square 
analysis with the Yates correction for continuity was performed. 
Because a difference between groups was not expected, a 
two-tailed test was selected for this analysis. As predicted, 
a significant difference in verbal compliance with the large 
request was not found between these groups. As shown in 
Table 3, 18% (7 of 39) of the experimental subjects and 
37% (14 of 38) of the one-contact control group members 
agreed to comply with the large request, ^  1 , n = 77), = 2.58,
critical value = 6.7.
To evaluate the hypothesis that the experimental group 
aschematic with respect to helpfulness would demonstrate a 
verbal compliance rate to the large request that was 
significantly higher than that which was obtained for its 
one-contact control group, a 2 (experimental vs. control) X 
2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) z-test for proportions
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Table 2
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the
Self-Schema Helpful Group
Yes No n
Experimental Group 10 32 42
24% 76%
One-Contact Control Group 21 21 42
50% 50%
Table 3
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the
Self-Schema Unhelpful Groups
Yes No n
Experimental Group 7 32 39
18% 82%
One-Contact Control Group 14 24 38
37% 63%
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with a Yates correction for continuity was conducted. The 
z-test for proportions was selected for this analysis 
because a directional prediction had been made; however, 
a significant difference was not found between the groups.
As shown in Table 4, 25% (16 of 64) of the aschematic 
experimental subjects verbally agreed to comply with the 
large request and 48% (31 of 65) of the one-contact control 
group members said they would comply, (z. = -2.47, critical 
value = 2.6, one-tailed).
The hypothesis that experimental subjects classified 
as aschematic for helpful, important would exhibit a verbal 
compliance rate to the large request that was significantly 
higher than that displayed by their respective one-contact 
control group members was tested by a 2 (experimental vs. 
control) X 2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) z-test for 
proportions with the Yates correction for continuity. A 
one-tailed test was chosen for this analysis because a 
directional prediction had been made; however, no significant 
difference was found between the groups. As shown in Table 
5, nearly 28% (8 of 29) of the aschematic for helpful, 
important experimental subjects and 48% (14 of 29) of the 
aschematic for helpful, important one-contact control group 
members agreed to comply with the large request, (z = -1.35, 
critical value = 2.6, one-tailed).
To test the hypothesis that the experimental subjects 
who were classified as aschematic for helpful, unimportant
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Table 4
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the 
Combined Aschematic Groups
Yes No n
Experimental Group 16 48 64
25% 75%
One-Contact Control Group 31 41 65
48% 52%
Table 5
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Laree Reauest for the
Aschematic for Helpful, Important Groups
Yes No n
Experimental Group 8 21 29
28% 72%
One-Contact Control Group 14 15 29
48% 52%
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would demonstrate a verbal compliance rate to the large 
request that would not differ significantly from that obtained 
for their respective one-contact control group members, a 
2 (experimental vs. control) X 2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) 
chi-square analysis with the Yates correction for continuity 
was performed. Because a directional prediction had not 
been made, a two-tailed test was selected for this analysis.
A significant difference between the groups was not found.
As shown in Table 6, 23% (8 of 35) of the experimental 
subjects agreed to help with the large request as did 
47% (17 of 36) of the one-contact control group members,
'jAl , n =71) = 3.6, critical value = 6.7).
Secondary Analyses
The hypothesis that the experimental subjects who were 
classified as self-schema helpful would exhibit a compliance 
rate to the initial request that was significantly higher 
than that displayed by those experimental subjects who were 
classified as aschematic with respect to helpfulness was 
analyzed by a 2 (schematic vs. aschematic) X (compliance vs. 
noncompliance) z-test for proportions with the Yates 
correction for continuity. Because a directional prediction 
had been made, a one-tailed test was selected for this analysis; 
however, a significant difference was not found between the 
groups. As shown in Table 7, 92% (44 of 48) of the self-schema 
helpful subjects complied with the small request as did 
86% (62 of 72) of the combined aschematic subjects ( z = 1.31,
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Table 6
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the 
Aschematic for Helpful. Unimportant Groups
Yes No n
Experimental Group 8 27 35
23% 77%
One-Contact Control Group 17 19 36
47% 53%
Table 7
Compliance Rate with the Small Request for the Self-Schema
Helpful Experimental Group and the Combined Aschematic
Experimental Group
Yes No n
Self-Schema Helpful Group 44 4 48
92% 8%
Combined Aschematic Group 62 10 72
86% 14%
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critical value = 2.6, one-tailed).
The hypothesis that the experimental subjects who were 
classified as self-schema unhelpful would demonstrate a 
compliance rate to the initial request that was significantly, 
lower than that displayed by the experimental subjects who 
were classified as aschematic with respect to helpfulness 
was analyzed with a 2 (schematic vs. aschematic) X 2 
(compliance vs. noncompliance) z-test for proportions 
with the Yates correction for continuity. A one-tailed test 
was selected for this analysis because a directional prediction 
had been made; however, a significant difference was not found 
between the groups. As Table 8 indicates, 89% (41 of 46) 
of the self-schema unhelpful subjects helped with the small 
request as did 86% (62 of 72) of the combined aschematic 
subjects, (z. = 0.79, critical value = 2.6, one-tailed).
To evaluate the hypothesis that the self-schema helpful 
one-contact control group members would display a verbal 
compliance rate to the large request that was significantly 
higher than that shown by the aschematic combined one-contact 
control group members, a 2 (schematic vs. aschematic) X 
2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) z-test for proportions with 
the Yates correction for continuity was performed. Because 
a directional prediction had been made, a one-tailed test 
was selected for this analysis; however, a significant 
difference was not found between the groups. As shown in 
Table 9, 50% (21 of 42) of the self-schema helpful
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Table 8
Compliance Rate with the Small Request for the Self-Schema
Unhelpful Experimental Group and the Combined Aschematic
Experimental Group
Yes No n
Self-Schema Unhelpful Group 41 5 46
89% 11%
Combined Aschematic Group 62 10 72
86% 14%
Table 9
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the
Self-Schema Helpful Control Group and the Combined Aschematic
Control Group
Yes No n
Self-Schema Helpful Group 21 21 42
50% 50%
Combined Aschematic Group '31 34 65
48% 52%
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one-contact control group members and 48% (31 of 65) of the 
combined aschematic one-contact control groups members agreed 
to help with the large request, (z = 0.40, critical 
value = 2.6, one-tailed).
The last hypothesis, that the frequency of verbal 
compliance with the large request for the self-schema unhelpful 
one-contact control group would be significantly lower than 
the frequency that was observed for the aschematic combined 
one-contact control group, was analyzed by a 2 (schematic vs. 
aschematic) X 2 (compliance vs. noncompliance) z-test for 
proportions with the Yates correction for continuity.
Because a directional prediction was made, a one-tailed test 
was selected for this analysis; however, a significant 
difference was not found between the groups. As shown in 
Table 10, 37% (14 of 38) of the self-schema unhelpful 
one-contact control group members agreed to .call for an 
appointment as did 48% (31 of 65) of the combined aschematic 
one-contact control group members, (z. = -0.9, critical 
value = 2.6, one-tailed).
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Table 10
Verbal Compliance Rate with the Large Request for the
Self-Schema Unhelpful Control Group and the Combined 
Aschematic Control Group
Yes No n
Self-Schema Unhelpful Group 14 24 38
37% 48%
Combined Aschematic Group 31 34 65
48% 52%
CHAPTER 4
Discussion
In this study, a number of hypotheses were proposed that 
were contingent upon the occurrence of a successful FITD 
manipulation. Although the overall chi-square analysis 
revealed a significant difference between the experimental 
group and the one-contact control group in frequency of 
verbal compliance with the large request, it was the 
one-contact control group and not the experimental group 
that demonstrated the higher rate of verbal compliance. 
Therefore, a FITD effect was not achieved, and the remaining 
analyses revealed that no other significant differences 
existed.
The results of this study are interesting for a number 
of reasons. First, an unexpected reversal of the FITD effect 
was found. Second, an unusually high base rate of verbal 
compliance to the larger request was obtained for 
one-contact control group members. Third, there was nearly 
a nonexistent performance of behavioral compliance with the 
large request by those who said they would comply. And, 
fourth, an examination of the data revealed that these 
findings were present in each of the individual conditions 
(i.e., regardless of classification with respect to the 
domain of helpfulness/unhelpfulness).
Although these results are unusual, they are not
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without some precedent in the literature. For example, 
several other studies (DeJong & Funder, 1977; Fish &
Kaplan, 1974; Zuckerman et a l ., 1979) have reported high
base rate compliance to the large request for control group 
members. Even though this differs from what is usually 
found in a FITD study, and one might consider a high base 
rate problematic because of its potential to interfere with 
the determination of a significant finding of the FITD 
effect, both the DeJong and Funder and the Zuckerman et a l . 
studies were able to demonstrate a significant result. 
Furthermore, in this study, as well as in the Fish and 
Kaplan investigation, the high base rate allowed for the 
discovery of an actual reversal of the effect.
The possibility of a reversal of the FITD phenomenon 
was entertained by Beaman et a l . (1983) as a result of
their meta-analysis study. These authors suggested that 
combining variables within the FITD paradigm could produce 
interactions that would not merely negate the FITD effect 
but could cause it to be significantly reversed.
As noted, the report of an actual significant reversal of 
the FITD effect was made by Fish and Kaplan (1974). These 
authors found that when experimental subjects passively 
complied with an initial request, or when they anticipated 
a future opportunity to comply with a request, their 
subjects agreed to a subsequent request at a rate that was 
significantly lower than that which was obtained for the
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control group members. Addressing their findings, Fish and 
Kaplan suggested that in some situations the initial act of 
compliance may function as a substitute or "token" activity 
which allows subjects to refuse a subsequent more demanding 
request that they would have likely complied with had they 
not been given "a way out". That is, by complying with the 
initial request, subjects can justify both their having done 
enough for a cause they feel unenthusiastically but morally 
obligated to assist, and their refusal of a subsequent more 
costly request. Although this explanation is interesting, 
it should be noted that one result the authors obtained 
disconfirms their reasoning, and that no measures were 
included in their study that would lend support to their 
conclusions. Furthermore, their investigation is not without 
methodological flaws with respect to the usual FITD paradigm.
The discussion by Beaman et a l . (1983), which resulted
from their meta-analysis study of the FITD literature, 
would suggest that a finding of a significant reversal of 
the FITD phenomenon could be more than just an accidental 
occurrence. Whether this is true for this study cannot be 
answered without further investigation; however, the 
possibility does suggest a number of issues for 
consideration.
Even though this study was designed to be a replication 
of the typical FITD paradigm, it is possible that some of 
its features were not as precise as what is necessary to
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obtain the outcome when one considers the weak mean effect 
size that has been reported for the phenomenon (Beaman et 
a l ., 1983; Dillard et a l ., 1983; Dillard, 1991). However, 
in this investigation the FITD effect was not merely absent 
as so often has been the case (Beaman et a l ., 1983; DeJong, 
1979; Dillard et a l ., 1984; Dillard, 1991), but rather 
a significant reversal of the effect was found. Therefore, 
it seems reasonable to assume that one or more variables, 
shown to moderate the FITD phenomenon, may have done so in 
this investigation.
A feature of this investigation that may differ from 
what is customary in the successful FITD paradigm was the 
size of the first request. Although previous studies had 
successfully used a similar first request (DeJong & Musilli, 
1982; Seligman et a l ., 1976), and pretesting of the request 
achieved a compliance rate of 100%, it is still possible 
that the request was too large. An investigation by 
Baron (1973) is consistent with this reasoning. When Baron 
presented one group of experimental subjects with a very 
small first request and a second group with a somewhat 
larger initial request, he found that 95% of the 
experimental subjects in both groups complied with the 
first request. However, whereas 50% of those in the very 
small first request condition complied with a subsequent 
larger request, the compliance rate for subjects in the 
somewhat larger initial request condition did not differ from
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that found for the one-contact control group. Even more 
interesting is his report that some experimental subjects in 
the somewhat larger initial request condition, when refusing 
to comply with the target request, "explained their refusal 
by stating that they had already 'done enough’ for the E ’s 
organization" (p. 114) and it was unfair to ask them to do 
more .
Although three meta-analyses (Beaman et a l ., 1983; 
Dillard et a l ., 1984; Fern, Monroe, & Avila, 1986) and one 
narrative review (DeJong, 1979) have been conducted on the 
FITD literature, the question about what constitutes an 
appropriate size for an initial request remains unanswered. 
Whereas Baron (1973) concluded from his investigation that 
a first request needed to be very small, Seligman et a l . 
(1976) concluded that a larger initial request was required, 
and both Beaman et a l . (1983) and Miller and Suls (1977)
suggested that a possible curvilinear relationship exists 
between the size of the first request and the rate of 
compliance with the subsequent larger request. While the 
possibility exists that the initial request in this 
investigation may have been too large to produce a FITD 
effect, it seems unlikely, based on previous research 
(Baron, 1973; Miller & Suls, 1977), that size alone would 
generate a significant reversal of the effect.
Although both the application of external pressure to 
comply with a small request (DeJong & Funder, 1977; DeJong
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& Musilli, 1982), and the availability of external 
justification for complying with an initial request (Reingen 
& Kernan, 1977; Uranowitz, 1975; Zuckerman et a l ., 1979) 
have been shown to moderate the FITD effect, neither appeared 
to be present in this investigation in either the content 
of the initial request or in its procedure for delivery.
While it is always possible that the manner of presentation 
of the initial request generated external pressure on 
subjects to comply or that the contents of the message 
allowed them to justify their compliance, both these 
possibilities seem remote.
Another variable that has been shown to be important 
for an effective FITD manipulation is the existence of a 
time delay between the first and second requests. In this 
investigation, the second appeal was made between two and 
four days after the initial request, and this would 
generally be accepted as an adequate time delay (Beaman et 
al . , 1983). However, an intriguing argument presented by 
Miller and Suls (1977) would suggest that this study may 
have required a longer delay between the first and second 
requests.
When Miller and Suls (1977) examined the effects of 
both a small initial request and a somewhat larger first 
request on subjects’ subsequent compliance with the target 
request, they found that only the small initial request 
produced a FITD effect. Addressing their results, these
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authors suggested that it is the time delay between the 
first and second request that is crucial in determining 
the size of initial request that would insure compliance 
with the second larger appeal. Miller and Suls argument 
is as follows: Gaining a subject’s compliance with a
second larger request is dependent not only on the change 
in se1f-perception that is thought to occur as a result of 
the initial act of compliance, but also on whether the 
initial act is salient when the subject is presented with 
the high cost second request. If subjects’ compliance with 
an initial request is sufficiently salient when they are 
presented with a costly second request, the individuals 
might refuse to perform the second request because they 
feel "that they had already done their 'good deed for the 
d a y ’" (P.206). However, if there is an adequate amount of 
delay between the first and second requests, the salience 
of the initial act should diminish and the subjects’ changed 
self-perceptions would impel them to comply with the larger 
second appeal.
Recall that Baron (1973) reported that some of the 
subjects in his somewhat larger initial request condition 
justified their refusal of the second request by saying 
that "they had already 'done enough’ for the E ’s 
organization" (p. 114), and that it was unfair to ask them 
to do more. This would indicate that the initial act was 
salient for these subjects when the second appeal was made
even though a full week had elapsed. However, because 
Baron used the same organizational name as the sponsor 
for each of his requests, it is difficult to determine 
whether the time delay between the first and second 
request was insufficient to diminish the salience of the 
initial activity or whether the second request was 
sufficient to reinstate the salience through association. 
Interestingly, Seligman et a l . (1976) also used the same
sponsor for each of their requests and yet, with just a 
two day time delay between their first and second requests, 
found that only their somewhat larger initial request 
conditions produced a FITD effect. Baron, however, may 
have reconciled these seemingly conflicting findings when 
he discussed the results of his investigation. He proposed 
that subjects in his somewhat larger initial request 
condition may have experienced feelings of psychological 
reactance (Brehm, 1966) when presented with the costly 
second request, and this may have reduced their 
responsiveness to the target request. He suggested further 
that the FITD manipulation may be effective only when the 
size of the first request is small enough to avoid the 
induction of subjects’ feelings of reactance.
What Baron (1973) implied is that subjects may have 
experienced a negative reaction to what they perceived as 
an external threat to their personal freedom; in this case, 
a negative reaction to being "set up" for a costly second
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request. Moreover, it would be this reaction that would 
cause subjects to respond in a direction opposite from the 
one that was desired and opposite from the way they would 
have normally reacted.
The possible influence of one additional variable that 
has been shown to moderate the FITD effect, the sex of the 
experimenter, should be addressed. Even though Beaman et 
al . (1983) reported that male experimenters produced larger
effect sizes for the FITD manipulation, the unavailability 
of male experimenters required that only female experimenters 
be used for this investigation. The effect this had on the 
outcome of this study is unclear.
One additional result should be addressed: the finding
of virtually no behavioral compliance with the large request. 
Although a previous study had indicated that a significant 
number of subjects would comply behaviorally with a request 
similar to the one presented in this investigation, a 
modification was made in the present study which may have 
caused the size of the large request to increase after 
verbal compliance with the request had been obtained. In 
the previous work, when subjects agreed to perform the 
large request, they were scheduled for their appointments 
and given a location for their interviews. The rate of 
behavioral compliance was determined by the number of 
individuals who arrived for appointments. However, in the 
present study, when subjects agreed to perform the large
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request, they were told of the requirement to telephone 
during certain hours to schedule an appointment that would 
require coming to campus for a 2 to 3 hour interview. The 
rate of behavioral compliance was determined by the number 
of individuals who called for an appointment. It may be 
that the requirement of calling for the appointment, and 
doing so during restricted hours, increased the cost of 
the large request and, thus, affected the outcome; however, 
this reasoning is based on speculation. What actually 
produced the result is a question which requires further 
investigation.
Conjectures
It is conceivable that the arguments developed both by 
Baron (1973) and by Miller and Suls (1977) are correct 
but, individually, incomplete explanations of what occurred 
in this investigation. More specifically, it is possible 
that the two to four day time delay that was used in this 
investigation was not of a sufficient length to diminish 
the salience of a somewhat larger sized initial activity. 
Moreover, it is also possible that similarities might have 
been seen between the first and second requests that would 
remind subjects of their previous acts of compliance. If 
the initial activity was salient and subjects felt they 
had been set up when they received the costly second 
request, it is conceivable that they would react negatively 
and would act in a direction opposite from the one that
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was desired, thus producing the reversal of the FITD effect 
that was found in this investigation.
Unfortunately, this argument is based on the 
speculations of other experimenters and cannot be supported 
either by the results reported in the literature or by the 
data gathered in this investigation. How the various 
variables interact within the FITD paradigm has not been 
explored in any systematic manner (Beaman et a l ., 1983)
and this, therefore, remains an intriguing empirical 
question.
Conelus ions
The purpose of this study, to investigate the possible 
attenuating effects that schematicity for helpfulness or 
unhelpfulness produced on the FITD phenomenon, was not 
achieved. The hypotheses that were proposed were contingent 
upon a successful FITD manipulation that was not obtained. 
Instead, a significant reversal of the FITD effect was found 
overall, and the trend was present in each of the individual 
conditions. Although speculations were made, why this 
occurred cannot be determined either from the current 
state of the FITD literature or from the data gathered in 
this investigation. For these reasons, no justification 
exists for a discussion of how the results of this study 
affect the self-perception theory explanation of the FITD 
phenomenon or the arguments of this thesis.
Although the design of this experiment was based on
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published FITD studies and on effective pilot work, the 
results seem to illustrate a point Beaman et a l . (1983)
made in their discussion of the findings of their 
meta-analysis study. These authors said that the combining 
of variables within the FITD paradigm could cause unknown 
interactions. This seems to be what occurred in this 
investigation.
With hindsight, it would seem reasonable to understand 
how the various variables interact when they are combined 
within the FITD paradigm to assure a consistent effect 
before attempting to evaluate the self-perception theory 
explanation for the phenomenon. It is my opinion that 
future research should be directed toward this goal.
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Footnotes
1
Although the original intent was to choose subjects 
who scored above the median on the various dimensions, to 
identify a sufficient number of potential self-schema 
helpful subjects, it was necessary to include individuals 
for consideration whose self-rating scores were either 14 
or 15 on the confidence distribution that had been formed 
from their helpfulness scale scores. This process 
identified 96 potential subjects for the self-schema helpful 
category.
2
To increase the number of potential self-schema 
unhelpful subjects, it was necessary to include individuals 
for consideration whose self-rating scores were equal to or 
greater than 9 on the importance distribution that had been 
formed from their helpfulness scale scores. The median for 
the importance distribution was 10.
3
In addition to the adjustment on the importance 
distribution, to identify a sufficient number of potential 
subjects for the self-schema unhelpful category, it again 
was necessary to include individuals for consideration 
whose self-rating scores were equal to (as well as greater 
than) the median of 10 for the confidence distribution 
that had been formed from their helpfulness scale scores. 
This process identified 85 potential self-schema unhelpful 
subjects.
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APPENDIX A
INFORMATION PROCESSING SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE
Name___________________________________ Age____Sex________
Year in school: Fr So Jr Se Other (please circle one)
Phone   Please indicate below the days and
time of day you can usually be reached by phone.
We all have characteristics that we can use to describe 
ourselves. Our characteristics may or may not be similar to 
the characteristics others use to describe themselves. Even 
if these are similar, people tend to differ on how strongly 
they feel the characteristic applies. We are interested in 
whether certain characteristics apply to you. When you read 
the following questions, REFLECT back on your day-to-day life, 
consider yourself and your usual behavior with regard to 
friends, casual acquaintances and strangers before you answer 
the question. When answering the questions, please COMPARE 
yourself and your usual behavior to that of other people that 
you know. FOR ALL THE ITEMS BELOW. PLEASE CIRCLE THE NUMBER 
THAT APPLIES TO YOU.
1. Friendly. an adjective, means demonstrating to another 
characteristics such as kindness, support, affection, or 
personal regard. How friendly are you?
Not at all Average Extremely
Friendly Friendly
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
How confident are you in the above judgment of yourself?
Not at all Average Extremely
confident Confident
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
How important is this characteristic to your self-image?
Not at all Average Extremely
Important Important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
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2. Understanding means a state of cooperative or mutually
tolerant relations between people. How understanding are you?
Not at all 
Understanding 
1 2  3 4
Average
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
How confident are you in the above judgment of yourself?
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
How important is this characteristic to your self-image?
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Extremely 
Understanding 
13 14 15
Not at all 
conf ident 
1 2  3
Not at all 
Important 
1 2  3
Extremely 
Conf ident 
14 15
Extremely 
Important 
14 15
3. Helpful. an adjective, means giving, or rendering aid or 
assistance; of service. How helpful are you?
Not at all 
Helpful
1 2  3
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
How confident are you in the above judgment of yourself?
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
How important is this characteristic to your self_image?
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Not at all 
confident 
1 2  3
Not at all 
Important 
1 2  3
Extremely 
Helpful 
14 15
Extremely 
Conf ident 
14 15
Extremely 
Important 
14 15
4. Generous. an adjective, means liberal in giving or sharing; 
unselfish. How generous are you?
Not at all 
Generous 
1 2  3
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
How confident are you in the above judgment of yourself?
Average
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Not at all 
conf ident 
1 2  3
Extremely 
Generous 
14 15
Extremely 
Conf ident 
14 15
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How important is this characteristic to your self-image?
Not at all Average Extremely
Important Important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Definitions for the words friendly, understanding, helpful, and 
generous were obtained from the following source:
Flexner, S . B ., & Hauck, L. C. (Eds.). (1987). The Random House
dictionary of the English language (second ed., unabridged).
New York: Random House.
APPENDIX B
SMALL REQUEST SCRIPT AND QUESTIONNAIRE
"Is t h i s ___________________________________ . Hello. My name
is Ann Myers. I am with the Bureau of Community Services.
we are conducting a survey of university students concerning
their use of community recreational facilities. Would you be
willing to help us by answering a number of questions for our
survey that will take only a couple of minutes?"
NOTE THE SUBJECT’S RESPONSE. Yes No
IF THE SUBJECT REFUSES SAY THE FOLLOWING:
"Okay. Thank you for your time".
IF THE SUBJECT AGREES SAY THE FOLLOWING:
"Okay. The first few questions are concerned with 
some background information so we can compare your 
answers with students who are similar to you."
1. "How old are you?"
2. "What is your year in school?"
3. "What is your major?"
4. "Are you from Missoula?"
IF THE ANSWER IS Y E S . GO TO QUESTION #6.
5. "What is your home town?"
"The remaining questions are concerning the types of 
things you do for fun?"
6. "Do you go to the movies?"
IE THE ANSWER IS NO^ GO TO QUESTION #8.
7. "Approximately how many movies do you see each month
8. "Do you ride a bike?"
IE THE ANSWER IS NO^ GO TO QUESTION # 1 0 .
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9. "Do you ride your bike on the designated bike routes 
around Missoula?"
10. "Do you make use of any of the city parks?"
IF THE ANSWER IS NO^. GO TO QUESTION #12 .
11. "Which park is your favorite?"
12. "Do you use the YMCA or another health club facility?" 
IF THE ANSWER IS NO, GO TO QUESTION #14.
13. "How many times each month do you do this?"
14. "Do you like to ski?"
IF THE ANSWER IS NO^ GO TO QUESTION # 1 6 .
15. "How many times each month during the winter do you
ski?"
16. "What is your favorite recreational activity?"
17. "What would you like to do for recreation that
you cannot do in this area?"
"That was the last of our questions. Y o u ’ve been very 
helpful. Thank you for participating in our survey."
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APPENDIX C 
SCRIPT FOR THE LARGE REQUEST
"Is t h i s  ? Hello. My
name is Sue Daniels. I am working for the research firm of 
Petty, Petty, and Barker. We are conducting research at the 
University of Montana collecting information concerning 
student’s views on university funding and other political 
issues. We are asking University of Montana students to 
help by responding to questions for a 2 to 3 hour period.
Would you be willing to come to our office on the U. M. campus 
and take 2 to 3 hours to be interviewed and answer written 
questions related to our project?"
NOTE THE SUBJECT’S RESPONSE TO THE REQUEST. YES NO
IF THE ANSWER WAS NO. SAY THE FOLLOWING:
"Okay, thank you for your time."
IF THE ANSWER WAS Y E S . SAY THE FOLLOWING:
"Because you will want to schedule the 2 to 3 hours at
at time that is convenient for you, I will give you the phone 
number of our appointment secretary. Do you have something to
write with? Okay. She can be reached at __-____  on
(days of the week and times available). Just call this 
number during one of the times I have given you and our 
secretary will set up an appointment that will be convenient 
for you. She will also tell you at that time what room on 
campus we will be using for this project. Thank you for 
your willingness to help with our project."
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APPENDIX D 
SCRIPT FOR ANSWERING COMPLIANCE CALLS 
"Hello. This is the Petty, Petty, and Barker 
appointment secretary. May I help you?"
THE PERSON CALLING SHOULD STATE THE REASON FOR THE C A L L .
IF THE PERSON STATED HIS OR HER NAME. SAY THE FOLLOWING:
" I ’m sorry, would you repeat your name for me so I can check 
my interviewing lists?"
WRITE DOWN THE SUBJECT’S FIRST AND LAST NAME. IF YOU ARE 
UNCERTAIN OF THE NAME. ASK THE SUBJECT TO SPELL THE N A M E .
IF THE PERSON DID NOT STATE HIS OR HER NAME. SAY THE FOLLOWING. 
"Would you please tell me your name so I can check my 
interviewing lists?"
WRITE DOWN THE SUBJECT’S FIRST AND LAST N A M E . IF YOU ARE 
UNCERTAIN OF THE NAME. ASK THE SUBJECT TO SPELL THE N A M E .
PAUSE FOR ABOUT FIVE SECONDS AND THEN SAY THE FOLLOWING:
"Thank you for waiting. I needed to find your name on 
our interviewing lists. I ’m really sorry to tell you this, 
but our interviewing schedule is already full. We had a 
larger response to our request than we anticipated. This 
doesn’t usually happen. We really appreciate your 
willingness to help with our study. Can we call you if 
we need you in the future? It is very likely that some of 
our appointments will cancel.
NOTE HOW SUBJECTS RESPONDS TO THIS QUESTION. YES NO 
"Okay. Thank you so much for calling."
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APPENDIX E
Critical Values for Bonferroni Chi-Square T e s t s . df =_ 1_
Compari sons Alpha = 0.05“ Alpha = 0.10*>
1/1 3 . 841 2.7
1/2 5.024 3 . 9
1/3 5 .731 4 . 6
1/4 6 .239 5 . 1
1/5 6 . 635 5 . 5
1/6 6 . 960 5 . 8
1/7 7 . 237 6.1
1/8 7.477 6.3
1/9 7 . 689 6 . 6
1/10 7 . 879 6.7
“The critical values were obtained from the following
source: Dayton, C. M . , & Schafer, W. D. (1974). Extended
tables of t and chi square for Bonferroni tests with unequa
error allocation. Journal of the American Statistical
Association. 68. p. 341. bThe critical values
for an alpha = 0.10 were interpolated from alpha = 0.05.
